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Professor Ann Scales wrote about places where legal feminism has
become stuck, and how it might become unstuck. This Essay focuses on
a particular point of "stuckness" in legal feminism: how to treat women
who love intimate partners who are abusive. This Essay argues that alt-
hough feminist legal scholars have discussed in great depth the many
reasons a woman in an abusive relationship might need to preserve her
relationship, they have inadequately exposed, or even acknowledged, the
reasons she might want to preserve her elationship. In particular, this
Essay argues, feminist legal scholars avoid or ignore the fact that a pri-
mary reason many women stay in abusive relationships is for love. Ac-
cording to many feminist legal scholars, love is a product of false con-
sciousness. With more and better information, abused women would
come to understand that they don't "really" love their partners, and that
leaving, rather than staying, is the solution. Scales argued that false con-
sciousness is a weak analytical tool for a variety of reasons, discussed in
this Essay in subpart II.B. More importantly, she argued that within legal
feminism, false consciousness is a "conversation stopper" and a "thought
stopper." In short, Scales attempted to get feminist legal scholars out of
the muck of false consciousness. This Essay documents how feminist
legal scholars are stuck on love in the context of intimate partner abuse,
and applies Scales's lessons for getting unstuck.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ann Scales wrote about places where legal feminism has become
stuck, and how it might become unstuck.1 One place of stuckness is theS ,,2
concept of "false consciousness. This is the notion that an oppressed
group (such as women in a patriarchal society) might falsely buy into the
ideology of an oppressive social system, and that these internalized be-
liefs both conceal and act against the oppressed group's (women's) real
interests.3 One example, observed by Scales, is the view that women who
have been physically abused by their male partners, but who do not wish
to end their relationships with those partners (such as by refusing to co-
operate with the criminal prosecution of them), are deemed to be suffer-
ing from false consciousness.4 By internalizing any number of dominant
ideologies-for example, that a "little bit" of domestic violence is ac-
ceptable in intimate relationships5-women perpetuate their own physi-
cal oppression by men.
In my own work in the field of intimate partner violence, I have ob-
served that, while feminist legal scholars have discussed in great depth
the many reasons a woman might need to preserve her relationship,6 we
have done a poor job exposing, or even acknowledging, the reasons she
might want to preserve her elationship.7 In particular, we ignore the fact
that a primary reason many women stay in abusive relationships is for
love.8 From a feminist perspective, love is a product of false conscious-
ness.9 With more and better information, abused women would come to
1. ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING, AND LEGAL THEORY passim
(2006). Scales divides her only book, a culmination in many respects of her corpus of scholarship,
into two parts: "Places of Stuckness: Roles, Rules, Facts, and the Liberal View of Human Nature,"
and "Places Beyond Stuckness: Feminist Notions, Controversies, and Promises."
2. Id. at 44, 120 (describing "false consciousness" as a term that signifies "a continuing
source of feminist infighting and paralysis").
3. Id. at 124 ("Most political theorists define false consciousness as a belief that is 'false,'
that is both produced by and reinforcing of an oppressive social system, and that conceals and acts
against the believer's real interests.").
4. Ann Scales, handout from presentation of her book LEGAL FEMINISM, supra note I, at the
University of Denver Sturm College of Law (Apr. 2007) (on file with author). For a review and
critique of this argument, see Margaret E. Johnson, Balancing Liberty, Dignity, and Safety: The
Impact of Domestic Violence Lethality Screening, 32 CARDOzO L. REV. 519, 561-73 (2010).
5. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Prob-
lem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 628 (2000) ("Though not as prevalent as it once was, the view that
occasional violence is a normal part of family life persists. Many decisionmakers either hold this
view or empathize with individuals who do. Predictably, these decisionmakers refuse aggressively to
enforce condemnatory domestic violence laws." (footnote omitted)). Kahan argues generally that
when the law is much more condemnatory of a social norm than the average decision maker tasked
to enforce it, the decision maker resists enforcing it. Id. at 607. This, in turn, reinforces the very
norm that lawmakers seek to change. Kahan calls this a problem of "sticky norms," and describes
intimate partner violence as falling squarely within it. Id. at 628.
6. See infra note 15.
7. Id.
8. See infra note 17 and accompanying discussion.
9. As observed recently by Leigh Goodmark:
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understand that hey don't really love their partners, and that leaving,
rather than staying, is the "real" solution.0
Scales argued that false consciousness is a weak analytical tool for a
variety of reasons, discussed in subpart II.B. of this Essay." More im-
portantly, she argued that within legal feminism false consciousness is a
"conversation stopper and a thought stopper."'' 2 Scales attempted to get
us unstuck. In this Essay, I document how feminist legal scholars are
stuck on love in the context of intimate partner abuse, and I apply
Scales's lessons for getting us unstuck.
II. THE LACK OF LOVE IN THE LITERATURE
A. How Legal Feminists Avoid and Apologize for Love'
3
Within the literature on intimate partner violence, many scholars
have observed that the law provides a one-size-fits-all solution: separa-
tion of the parties.14 To illustrate why separation cannot be the only solu-
Rather than listening to women who want to stay in their relationships, though, those
women are said to have traumatically bonded or are told that they are rationalizing away
the abuse in order to protect their emotional commitments....
... Hesitation or unwillingness to end a relationship means that the woman is being co-
erced, threatened, or controlled; from the feminist perspective, such women might be ac-
cused of "false consciousness."
LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 100
(2012).
10. Id. ("We must focus on love, the literature argues, in order to show women that they don't
really love their partners, but rather are bonded with them in an unhealthy manner, and that separa-
tion, not saving their relationships, should be their goal.").
It. See discussion infra II.B.
12. SCALES, supra note 1, at 120.
13. For the purposes of this Essay, I include the work of legal scholars who have written
extensively about how the law might more effectively address intimate partner violence, and who
have grappled with the tension between protecting women and respecting their autonomy of decision
making (or agency). The list quite certainly is non-exhaustive but includes a number of the most
prolific scholars on the subject, including Kathy Abrams, Donna Coker, Clare Dalton, Deborah
Epstein, Sally Goldfarb, Leigh Goodmark, Cheryl Hanna, Margaret Johnson, Laurie Kohn, Tamara
Kuennen, Christine Littleton, Martha Mahoney, Holly MacGuigan, Kris Miccio, Linda Mills, Emily
Sack, and Elizabeth Schneider, to name several but not all.
14. See, e.g., GOODMARK, supra note 9, at 80-105 ("[Dlomestic violence law and policy
continues to rely almost exclusively on separation-based remedies. The focus on separation springs
from a core belief that women in violent relationships should not remain in those relationships.");
Cheryl Hanna, Because Breaking up Is Hard to Do, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 92, 94 (2006)
("We should always rethink our strategies and avoid one-size-fits-all approaches. The criminaliza-
tion of domestic violence is still in its infancy, and we have much to learn about what works best and
for whom."); G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the
Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 307 (2005) ("Both law
and popular culture equate existence of violence with separation from the relationship."); id. at 305
(describing the predominant, or "[p]rotagonist[]," ideology underlying the current criminal justice
system approach as emphasizing the need for victims to leave their relationships as a deeply prob-
lematic one-size-fits-all approach); Nancy Ver Steegh & Clare Dalton, Report from the Wingspread
Conference on Domestic Violence and Family Courts, 46 FAM. CT. REv. 454, 456 (2008) ("In many
jurisdictions domestic violence cases, identified principally by evidence of physical violence, are
handled on a one-size-fits-all basis."); see also DONILEEN R. LOSEKE, THE BATFERED WOMAN AND
SHELTERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WIFE ABUSE 20 (1992) ("The collective representation
of wife abuse leads to the common sense conclusion that a woman should leave such a relationship,
and this prescription is part of the collective representation: A woman experiencing wife abuse must
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tion, several scholars have brilliantly unearthed the many rational reasons
that victims of intimate partner violence need, or want, to preserve their
intimate relationships. Amongst these are safety (the well-documented
fact that separation is the most dangerous time for victims), finances,
cultural norms, religion, and immigration status, to name but a few.'
5
Feminist legal scholarship, addressing intimate partner violence, richly
and deeply covers this particular topic.
Rarely in this body of work, however, do scholars explore in any
depth the idea that love for a partner may be the primary reason a woman
wants to preserve her relationship.'6 This dearth of discussion is remark-
able, considering that empirical data clearly show that women explicitly
state that love is a key reason explaining why they stay.
17
Even more remarkably, those few scholars who acknowledge love
rarely use the word love in their writing. Rather, we opt for more clinical,
sanitized terms. Instead of love, scholars use terms such as "connection"
leave her relationship." (emphasis added)); Sally Engle Merry, Wife Battering and the Ambiguities of
Rights, in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 271, 304 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds.,
1995) (arguing that the price women pay for going to court is separation, and that the law expects
women to sever connections with violent men); Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection
Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1498 (2008) ("The cumulative effect of these [mandatory] reforms was a
transformation of legal policy from the assumption that battered wom[e]n should stay to the assump-
tion that they should leave."); Leigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know that for Sure?:
Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
7, 8 (2004) ("[A]lmost all of these legal interventions are premised on the notion that battered wom-
en want to end their relationships, invoke the power of the legal system to keep their batterers away,
and ultimately sever all legal ties with their abusers."); Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home,
116 YALE L.J. 2, 59 (2006) ("A decision to effectively end a relationship is initiated by the prosecu-
tor on behalf of the state, adjudicated as a criminal matter, and criminally enforced. It becomes an
extension of the imperative to treat DV as a crime.").
15. See Tamara L. Kuennen, Private Relationships and Public Problems: Applying Principles
of Relational Contract Theory to Domestic Violence, 2010 BYU L. REV. 515, 530-36 (2010) (re-
viewing the literature discussing the multiple reasons that explain why a woman might want or need
to preserve the intimate relationship).
16. There are just a handful of exceptions where love is explored as a reason for staying in a
violent relationship. See Katharine K. Baker, Dialectics and Domestic Abuse, 110 YALE L.J. 1459,
1474-75 (2001) (reviewing ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST
LAWMAKING (2000)) ("[Women] do not necessarily want o be in a position where they can just
leave. They want to be in relationships in which they forgive. They may even want to be in relation-
ships that involve some relinquishment of self, autonomy, and power. And what is more, they are not
alone. Women who are not in battering relationships and men who do not batter want these kinds of
relationships too." (footnotes omitted)); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 19-21 (1991) (observing that women's
response to violence in a relationship relies on numerous goals: their experience of the violence,
economic security, love of partner, and view of life outside of the relationship, among others). See
generally LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE ABUSE
25-31 (2003); Cheryl Hanna, Rethinking Consent in a Big Love Way, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. Ill
passim (2010) (discussed in detail infra Part Ill).
17. See Catherine Donovan & Marianne Hester, 'I Hate the Word "Victim"': An Exploration
of Recognition of Domestic Violence in Same Sex Relationships, 9 SOc. POL'Y & SOC'Y 279, 282
(2010) (reviewing a body of empirical studies that have concluded that "[1]ove for a partner and hope
for the future of the relationship are amongst key reasons given by people in heterosexual and same
sex relationships for staying in or returning to domestically violent relationships").
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and "emotional attachment."8 To fully appreciate the degree of discom-
fort such sanitized words display, one need only imagine saying, "I feel
emotionally attached to you," or "I am deeply connected to you," rather
than, "I love you," to one's spouse or partner before hanging up the
phone or turning in for the evening. Or imagine explaining to someone
outside of the relationship how you feel about your partner by saying: "I
feel very emotionally connected to her."
Worse, on the rare occasions when scholars explicitly acknowledge
that women may love their partners, we frequently are apologetic,'9 sug-
gesting that we (feminist legal scholars) resign ourselves to "accept" the
reality that the women we are advocating for do, indeed, love their part-
20ners.
If listening to women subjected to abuse is important to feminist le-
gal scholars, as they claim, and if women are "experts on their own lives,
attuned to the likelihood of future abuse," why do we not defer to a
woman's expression of love, and her desire to continue an intimate rela-
tionship, even when it is abusive?2' Our treatment-whether it be avoid-
ance or apology-illustrates our stuckness with regard to how to treat
women who love their abusive partners.
18. See, e.g., Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies: Prioritiz-
ing Victims'Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, II AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL'Y & L. 465, 476-79, 493 (2003) (describing in detail the multiple "[r]elational [f]actors"
that go into a woman's decision making regarding whether to preserve the relationship, using "emo-
tional connection" and "emotional attachment," though mentioning the word love one time, on page
493 ("A woman may love her partner but also be afraid of him.")); Goldfarb, supra note 14, at 1500
(describing "mutual emotional commitment, companionship, intimacy, and sharing," but never using
the word love (emphasis added)); Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies,
and Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1113-14 (2009) ("The cur-
rent [civil protection order] laws are particularly well situated to permit petitioners to construct a
remedy that redefines a relationship that is tainted by abuse but nonetheless is meaningful-
connected by children, economics, emotional, and psychological ties." (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted)); Kuennen, supra note 15, at 537 ("A victim may choose to stay in a relationship that she
knows is dangerous because the intimate connection is worth the risk." (emphasis added)).
19. See GOODMARK, supra note 9, at 98 ("The domestic violence literature tiptoes carefully
around the concept of love. The literature accepts the idea that some women subjected to abuse do,
in fact, continue to say that they love their partners despite the abuse. But the literature explains this
love away, almost apologizing for the desire of women to continue their relationships.").
20. See, e.g., LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A
SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 90 (2008) ("We
need to ensure that every battered woman has the opportunity and ability to leave her relationship,
receives sufficient counseling to make the most independent choice possible, and is fully informed
about available alternatives. But we also need to understand and accept that some women will decide
to continue a connection with an abusive partner .. " (emphasis added)); Goldfarb, supra note 14,
at 1500-01 (describing the multidimensional emotions that abusive relationships produce, such as
"mutual emotional commitment, companionship, intimacy, and sharing," and thus concluding that
the aspiration of many women to remain with their partners "should not be dismissed as naive or
misguided" (emphasis added)).
21. This is a central question posed by Leigh Goodmark. See GOODMARK, supra note 9, at
100.
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B. Love As a Product of False Consciousness
Scales traced the concept of false consciousness to political theorist
Friedrich Engels and discussed its heritage prior to becoming associated,
22
in this country, with dominance feminism in the 1970s. Pertinent to the
present discussion is Scales's working definition of false consciousness
as "a false belief that is produced by and reinforces existing power ar-
rangements in society, and that is held in spite of being contrary to the
holder's own interests."
23
This concept of false consciousness comes up in two ways for
scholars who write about intimate partner violence. The first is that
women in abusive relationships do not really understand the danger they
are in.2 4 More specifically, women who say that they love their abusive
partners, and thus choose not to support criminal prosecution, or choose
not to seek restraining orders, or who otherwise generally do not avail
themselves of legal remedies designed to separate them from their part-
ners, are unable to fully or realistically or rationally appraise their risk of
danger.
Empirical data, however, make indisputably clear that women in
abusive relationships appraise their danger more accurately than any
assessment tool out there.25 To date, there is no tool social science has to
offer that women who have experienced abusive relationships cannot
more accurately outscore.
26
The second, much more complex argument is that a woman in an
abusive relationship doesn't really love her partner; rather, what she ex-
periences as "love" is actually an unconscious, conditioned reflex to liv-
ing in a sexist, oppressive culture that tells her she must be with a man at
all costs. This is what Scales called the "cult of true womanhood.2 7 The
argument proceeds that if the woman was conscious of her own oppres-
sion, she would be able to make an authentic choice. In this instance, the
choice would be either: (1) not to love a partner who is abusive, or (2)
desire to leave a partner who is abusive.
Scales argued, persuasively, that false consciousness is a weak ana-
lytical tool for several reasons. First and foremost, an accusation of false
consciousness implies that "there is a 'true' consciousness accessible to
the critic against which the consciousness of the criticized can be con-
22. SCALES, supra note 1, at 123-29.
23. Id. at 129.
24. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 559-61 (describing an important part of danger assessment
as whether "women suffer from a false consciousness of their risk of future violence or a diminished
capacity" in decision making).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. SCALES, supra note 1, at 132 (internal quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 91":1
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trasted.' '28 Scales flatly rejected this notion. One cannot claim to objec-
tively know another's interests.29
Even if an outsider could gain access to another's "true" conscious-
ness or genuine interests, another of "the obvious analytical problems"
30
with false consciousness is figuring out how to measure whether the per-
son is choosing beliefs that are consistent or inconsistent with their genu-
ine interests. As Scales stated, "Even if we could presume to interfere in
another's interests, what interests would we need to be talking about?
Short- or long-term interests? Individual or group-based interests? What
interests can we isolate and which should we include? Economic, psy-
chological, communicative, technological, sexual, intellectual, politi-
cal?'
31
Finally, Scales asked: "Could it never be said that I have a genuine
interest in undermining my own interests... ?,32
For all of these reasons, Scales rejected the term false conscious-
ness, which she characterized as "debilitating for feminist efforts. '33 Ra-
ther, she argued, what is important is recognizing what the concept has
meant or could mean. "For all the postmodem critique and other sources
of destabilization of political action, we have got to have some concepts
(and names for) the traps and, yes, falsehoods, that invite people without
power to participate in their powerlessness."
34
Scales did not coin a new term, but she thoughtfully described two
levels of responsible inquiry into oppressive falsehoods: personal and
political.35 Regarding the personal, she observed:
When I have thought of people (especially those I like and otherwise
trust) as being wrong or deluded, my conclusions tend to follow from
having observed similar mistakes or delusions among my own inter-
nalized oppressions. I have no doubt that it is my responsibility to
continue to take that self-inventory, nor any doubt that I will uncover
more sources of self oppression.
36
Consequently, the political:
The responsibility of being a political actor, a lawyer, an author, a
teacher, a parent-a human-is to find evidence and good arguments
28. Id. at 129.
29. Id. ("The now widespread belief in the social character of knowledge renders suspect any
suggestion of objective knowledge about other people's interest or even one's own interests.").
30. This is Scales's characterization. Id. at 129-30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Id. at 130.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 133.
34. Id. at 134.
35. This allusion to the personal and political, or personal is political, is not lost on Scales's
audience.
36. SCALES, supra note 1, at 134.
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and alternatives in every situation where it appears that a person or
group could profitably reinterpret her or their own experience. And it
is never that "you are completely wrong and worthless." These inter-
actions are always partial; it is this [partial] aspect of experience that
could be reinterpreted .... 37
Rather than ignoring, denying, or patronizing women who experi-
ence and express love for their intimate partners, even in the context of
abuse, we must ask women to examine their own feelings and beliefs.
We might probe whether the love they feel is only loosely, or rather is
quite closely, tied to the cult of true womanhood. We might ask if the
love they feel causes them to surrender to the identities of their part-
ners.38 We might not like their answers. We might also ask if the love
that women feel is a source of strength.39 Or a source of safety. Or even a
source of survival.n0 Perhaps it is any and all of these; perhaps it is none.
Examining, rather than denying, love in the context of intimate partner
violence should be the business of feminist lawyers. And examining,
rather than denying, our discomfort with love in the context of intimate
partner violence should be the business of feminist legal scholars.
C. Other Reasons Explaining Why We Don 't Talk About Love
There certainly are reasons, other than false consciousness, explain-
ing why feminist legal scholars do not explore, let alone address, the love
a woman may feel for an abusive partner. First, it could be a political
disaster for the battered women's movement, for it could jeopardize the
hard-fought battle to get the state to take domestic violence seriously,
and to treat domestic violence as a serious crime rather than a private
"relationship problem" to be dealt with in the home.41 "How could we
possibly take seriously women's accounts of love and hope without un-
dermining the little protection from male violence women have been able
to wrest from the legal system, without indeed increasing our already
37. Id.
38. See Baker, supra note 16, at 1474 (arguing that some women may desire to relinquish
their selves to that of another).
39. E-mail from Evan Stark, Assoc. Professor of Pub. Admin. & Dir. of Master's in Pub.
Health Program, Rutgers University, Dir. of Div. of Urban Health Admin., UMDNJ School of Pub.
Health to author (Mar. 20, 2013, 3:47 PM) (on file with author).
40. See id.
41. Scholars in the field do indeed make these arguments. See, e.g., Christine A. Littleton,
Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 51 (1989) ("Often it appears as if feminist questioning of the [law's]
impulse toward separation should at least wait until women can count on the law allowing them to
separate."); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic
Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1688-90 (2004) (warning that the divide amongst femi-
nists with regard to aggressive state interventions threatens the ground gained: "Isn't this where we
were over twenty-five years ago?").
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overwhelming vulnerability? '42 This is indeed a dilemma for battered
women's advocates and activists.
One piece of this political problem is, as Leigh Goodmark de-
scribes, "the need to prevent a return to [outdated and] discredited theo-
ries about why women subjected to abuse stayed with their abusers.,
43
She cites as examples masochism and learned helplessness."a If feminist
legal scholars were to fully bring to light the fact that many women love
their abusive partners, they risk that women will once again be seen as
pathological.
This is indeed a problem, but is not insurmountable. We have new
theoretical constructs to temper, if not alleviate, this concern.45 In the
past two decades, researchers have done extraordinary work to differen-
tiate among types of physical aggression that occur in intimate partner-
46ships.6 These theories call for critical examination of the context of ag-
gressive acts and words, and specifically of the intent of the perpetrator
and the effect on the victim. Aggression, according to lead theorists, ex-
ists on a continuum: at one end, there is situational "fighting" that is not
uncommon or outside of community norms; at the other end, there is the
use of coercively controlling tactics-including, but not limited to, vio-
lence-that are deliberately intended to restrict the victim's liberty and to
control every aspect of her life. 4
Perhaps some degree of aggression in intimate relationships is ac-
ceptable. Renowned sociologist Evan Stark argued that if scholars writ-
ing in the area of intimate partner violence accepted the possibility that
not all violence in relationships is abusive (and the flip side of this coin,
that many forms of coercive, but nonviolent, conduct are abusive), we
might better understand, explain, and address the most dangerous, and
always-gendered, type of intimate partner violence: "coercive control.
48
Currently, what the law labels "domestic violence" is a misnomer. A
woman who slaps her husband once is as much a perpetrator of the crime
of domestic violence under the current legal regime as a man who is both
42. GOODMARK, supra note 9, at 98 (quoting Littleton, supra note 41, at 47) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
43. Id.
44. Id. ("Researchers once theorized that masochism kept women from leaving .... [S]ome
have claimed that learned helplessness is simply masochism devoid of its erotic component.").
45. This is not to say that Goodmark's concerns are exaggerated or misplaced; I too worry,
despite these new constructs.
46. Goodmark provides an overview of these theories. GOODMARK, supra note 9, at 38-40.
47. See EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE
104-06 (2007).
48. Evan Stark's work is highly respected by legal scholars who argue for law reform in
domestic violence cases. Stark's differentiation amongst types of "domestic violence" has been
widely discussed. He argued that there is a difference between "fights," "assaults," and "coercive
control," the latter being the most serious and debilitating, perpetrated by men against women for the
purpose of restricting the woman's freedom and dignity and, consequently, where feminists should
focus their attention. See id.
2013]
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violent and dominates every aspect of his partner's life, such as what she
wears, whether she may have friendships outside of the relationship, and
how much money she has. The current legal definition is problematic not
only because it focuses too narrowly on discrete incidents of physical
violence, without capturing the many coercive tactics shy of using vio-
lence that a perpetrator may use to control every aspect of a victim's life,
but also because it is too broad; within its net is caught fighting-what
couples in intact relationships do, sometimes, that simply does not fall
outside of a community norm.4 9
If feminist legal scholars were more discerning in targeting legal
sanctions on the intent and consequences of coercive control, portraying
it as the domination of a life, rather than continuing to use less politically
charged words such as abuse or control, they could broaden
the demand for justice beyond the relatively narrow emphasis on vio-
lence-free relationships, put[] the attainment of substantive equality
back on the table, and suggest[] an agenda of rights and redistribution
that would attract constituencies from civil rights and labor that have
kept their distance because of our emphasis on policing.
50
Still, Stark recognizes the political risk:
[R]eintroducing domination as the focus of concern will cost us allies
with no particular sympathy for feminist issues, including those op-
ponents of "violence against women" who accept traditional gender
hierarchies and view women paternalistically .... In the current cli-
mate of reaction, the media may counter talk of domination by put-
ting our battered sisters and their supporters back into jumpsuits; pic-
turing them as crocks, cranks, harpies, or worse .... 51
But, he argues, "ledgers have two sides. Reassigning attention to
domination could constitute a new audience, attract a cohort of activists
energized by a desire to be free rather than merely safe, and lay the foun-
dation for new alliances to replace those we lose. 52
In addition to attracting new allies, the systematic differentiation of
intimate partner violence into types and degrees could generate a produc-
tive conversation between scholars who do not write in the field of inti-
mate partner violence and those who do. Many legal scholars who write
about the law and intimate relationships (such as family law scholars and
"law and emotion" scholars) write as if marriage and "normal" intimate
49. Goodmark attempts to resolve these problems when she redefines the crime of domestic
violence in Chapter 2. GOODMARK, supra note 9, at 29-53.
50. STARK, supra note 47, at 371.
51. Id. at370.
52. Id. Stark here refers to activists in civil rights and labor who have been repelled by the
law-and-order and policing emphases of the battered women's movement, and to thousands of men
and women who have been turned off by the current victimization narrative. Id. at 370-71.
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relationships do not involve fights, physical aggression, or coercion.5 3
Kathy Abrams observed that because the law does not engage with in-
tact-intimate and familial relationships, but rather with relationships that
are breaking up, scholars have under-investigated the fear, pain, despair,
and abuse that occur in "normal" relationships.
54
It has long been interesting to me to read family law articles sug-
gesting comprehensive, forward-looking reforms, and then to see a care-
fully worded exception qualifying the reforms as inapplicable to relation-
ships marked by intimate partner violence.55 Given the prevalence of
intimate partner violence, these scholars' reforms likely do not apply to
nearly half of all the relationships they describe.56 On the flip side of this
coin, scholars writing in the area of intimate partner violence have under-
investigated, if not dismissed, many of the emotions that occur in intact
relationships.57 Namely, love.
I1. GETTING "UNSTUCK"
That feminist legal scholars writing in the field of intimate partner
violence are stuck on love would be of less concern to Scales than if we
53. See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, The Elkins Legislation: Will California Change Family
Law Again?, 15 Chap. L. Rev. 443, 489 (2012) ("There is virtually universal agreement that except
in rare cases involving domestic violence[,] . . . negotiated agreements in family law cases benefit
both the parties to the dispute, the court system as a whole, and the children who are the subject of
the dispute."); Deborah Cantrell, The Role of Equipoise in Family Law, 14 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 63, 63
(2012) (reviewing the legal scholarship in family law over the last twenty years, and proposing that
"courts and court-annexed programs build out practices of equipoise," defined as a "mode of pro-
cessing information and emotions that disrupts habituated and unhelpful interactions between per-
sons and instead encourages thoughtful engagement with emotions, resulting in reduced adversarial-
ness and constructive problem solving," but never mentioning or addressing cases involving domes-
tic violence); Andrew Schepard, Kramer vs. Kramer Revisited: A Comment on The Miller Commis-
sion Report and the Obligation of Divorce Lawyers for Parents to Discuss Alternative Dispute
Resolution with Their Clients, 27 PACE L. REV. 677, 679 (2007) (arguing that lawyers should have
the obligation to advise clients regarding mediation and altematives to litigation in family law cases,
but stating, "[M]ediation may not be appropriate in cases involving serious allegations... of domes-
tic violence."); Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for De-
pendency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 246 (2004) ("It is well established that secure relationships
with parents contribute in critical ways to healthy child development and that family dissolution
imposes financial and psychological costs on children. Other than in situations of domestic vio-
lence,.., children's development usually is enhanced if their parents' relationship endures.")
54. Kathryn Abrams, Barriers and Boundaries: Exploring Emotion in the Law of the Family,
16 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 301, 307-08 (2009) (explaining the barriers to acknowledging emotion in
family law, one of which being that the legal system does not engage with intact families and thus
we have scant understanding of the feelings of despair, jealousy, and pain that are normal parts of
relationships).
55. A wonderful exception to this norm, and one I hope to see replicated, is Clare Hunting-
ton's discussion of the typologies of violence and how her proposed "reparative model" of family
law could apply to some types of abusive relationships in which there has been a history of violence.
See Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1312-16 (2008).
56. Martha Mahoney beautifully made this point more than two decades ago. Despite the
statistics showing domestic violence to be "extremely widespread in American society," and the fact
that the statistics themselves are "widely reproduced, there is little social or legal recognition that
domestic violence has touched the lives of many people in this society .... This radical discrepancy
between the 'mysterious' character of domestic violence and repeatedly gathered statistics reflects
massive denial throughout society and the legal system." Mahoney, supra note 16, at 10-11.
57. For a detailed discussion on this theory of "Getting Unstuck," see infra Part Ill.
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stayed stuck. Any place of stuckness is a place, and an opportunity, to be
recognized; and Scales argued, to be constantly reinterpreted.
58
A. An Illustration of Getting Unstuck
In a recent article, Cheryl Hanna discussed love in the context of in-
timate partner violence.59 Her article is exceptional not only for this rea-
son, but also because it is a departure from her previous work; she rein-
terprets her prior, closely held and widely cited position regarding the
value of women's personal autonomy in intimate partner violence.
In the article, Hanna observed: "What to do about the role of love in
relation to those choices that we make creates a particular dilemma for
feminist legal theory."60 A key strand of her argument is that while wom-
en may not choose to be involved in intimate relationships that are abu-
sive, they may accept the relationships nonetheless. After all, she ob-
serves, the "nearly universal desire [for love and] to be in a relationship.
often leads us to accept situations we never anticipated or wanted.61
"Yet, the law, neither in theory nor in practice, does a very good job at
understanding the role love plays when we consent to things that may
cause us heartache and harm.62
The article explores the question, left open after Lawrence v. Tex-
as,63 of under what circumstances individuals should be allowed to con-
sent to activity that occurs in the context of their private, intimate rela-
tionships. Hanna examines, among others, a case involving intimate
partner violence.64 When the police responded to the home, the victim
told them that her husband had threatened to "kill her by snapping her
neck and that he told her he had a gun in the house."65 The victim did not
support the prosecution, and she recanted during trial. As of the writing
of Hanna's article-ten years after the trial-the couple was still married
and living together.
66
In that case, Hanna argues, the victim did not necessarily consent to
the discrete threat, but Hanna asks us to think more expansively about
consent and what it means.67 While a victim may not "choose" her part-
58. SCALES, supra note 1, at 38 (describing how points of stuckness can be chalked up to
"essentially contested concept[s]"-ones that have "permanent potential critical value" to be exam-
ined and reinterpreted (quoting W. B. Gallie, IX Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 167, 169, 193 (1956)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Hanna, supra note 16.
60. Id. at 128.
61. Id. at 113.
62. Id. at 127.
63. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
64. Hanna, supra note 16, at 145-48 (examining People v. Brown, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 743
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2001), in which football star Jim Brown was accused of threatening his
wife, Monique).
65. Id. at 145.
66. Id. at 148.
67. Id. at 146-47.
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ner's anger or aggression, she may "put up with it." 68 She understands
the risks to herself. She values the relationship. Perhaps the consent,
then, is to the relationship as a whole.69 Why should the state intervene,
Hanna asks, particularly after Lawrence, in which the Supreme Court
recognized that love can be an expression of autonomy and thus protect-
ed as a liberty interest?
70
The problem is where to draw the line. Hanna asks a number of
questions: Are there "instances in which the law ought not respect an
individual's expression of love?",71 Such as when she is at risk of lethal
violence?72 In that circumstance, should not a prosecutor prosecute, de-
spite the victim's desire to preserve the relationship because she loves
her partner?73 And if individual women, rather than state prosecutors,
decide whether to prosecute men for crimes of physical and sexual vio-
lence, is this not the practical equivalent to allowing a defense of con-
sent?74 The state is allowing the woman to consent both to the discrete
act of violence that is the subject of the prosecution, and it is allowing
her to consent to remain in a risky relationship.75
Hanna grapples with each of these questions, and she concludes that
76there is no right answer. In each case, there is the potential for men to
exploit women, and in each case, the women "derive some benefits,...
pleasure, ... joy, or ... love[,]" and "also suffer some harm . . . from
both male... aggression[] and... state intervention.77
Hanna concludes that feminist legal scholars must continue to
struggle with these tensions.78 To remain relevant, feminist legal theory
should "persuade us to accept ambivalence, and to be open to changing
our minds because of the complicated nature" of women's (and men's)
lives.79 Indeed, Hanna herself, as evidenced by the article, changed her
mind; she acknowledges that in past scholarship, she did not give ade-
quate weight to the privacy and liberty interests of victims, and to the
68. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. To be clear, Hanna does not equate consent with choice; women who love their abusive
partners do not choose to be abused. Rather, Hanna argues that women who remain in abusive rela-
tionships may be willing to risk being abused because of their love. Id. at 136, 146-47.
70. Id. at 128 (discussing Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558).
71. Id. at 129.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 138-39.
74. See id. at 139-42.
75. If the law allows women in violent, intimate relationships to decide when the state should
intervene (i.e., allows women to consent to remain in risky relationships), "the consequence would
be less legal restraints on men in the fulfillment of their sexual and aggressive desires." Id. at 135.
76. Id. at 155.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 156.
79. Id.
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damage to women's overall autonomy when the state intervenes against
their wishes.8 °
B. Moving Forward
A fundamental tenet of feminism is listening to women's voices.81
Catharine MacKinnon (who Scales was devoted to) described listening to
and believing what women say as the "methodological secret" of femi-
nism.82 As stated previously, feminists working in and writing about the
battered women's movement have described women subjected to abuse
as "the experts on their own lives, attuned to the likelihood of future
abuse."83 This description is not ideological gloss; it is grounded in fact.
Women in abusive relationships are the best predictors of their risk of re-
abuse. As discussed previously, victims outscore every metric designed
by social scientists to assess future risk. 84
It is not only risk of re-abuse (in an already abusive relationship)
that poses a danger to women. It is the existence of the intimate relation-
ship itself. Relationships, like sex, can be dangerous.85 When women
choose, in the face of such risk, to both enter into and to preserve their
relationships for love, perhaps it is because they value love more than, or
at least as much as, physical safety. To remain relevant, feminist legal
scholars must grasp the importance of love and intimate relationships in
women's lives.86
IV. CONCLUSION
Feminist legal scholars are stuck on love in the context of intimate
partner violence. This stuckness presents an opportunity to become un-
stuck if we accept it instead of chalking it up merely to false conscious-
ness or some other conversation stopper.87 If we do not take the oppor-
tunity to consider the importance of love, then we will base the laws,
policies, and decisions we make about intimate partner violence on seri-
ously incomplete or erroneous information. But if we examine, rather
80. Id. at 144.
81. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 90; ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED
WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 71-73 (2000) (discussing the importance of accounting for wom-
en's particular experiences when crafting law and policy); see also Linda C. McClain, Toward a
Formative Project of Securing Freedom and Equality, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1221, 1225-32 (2000)
(discussing two different forms of feminist critique within the context of constitutional theory and
empiricism).
82. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 5
(1987).
83. GOODMARK, supra note 9, at 100.
84. For a review of empirical work illustrating that women are the best predictors of future
violence, see Margaret Johnson, supra note 4, at 559-60.
85. See Baker, supra note 16, at 1475 ("Relationships of any kind-platonic, sexual, or famil-
ial-can be emotionally and physically dangerous, but they may also be inevitable or at least desira-
ble.").
86. Id. at 1460-61 (reviewing SCHNEIDER, supra note 81).
87. See SCALES, supra note 1, at 120-21.
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than deny via the vehicle of false consciousness, the importance of love,
we could better dismantle the notion that women who stay in abusive
relationships are helpless or crazy. Scales's dismantling and reinterpreta-
tion of the concept of false consciousness provides feminist legal schol-
ars with this opportunity.

